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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, warrantless automobile searches by law enforcement officers have grown into the most perplexing fourth amendment
issue confronting the courts. This preeminence is, in part, the natural
consequence of the automobile's predominant role in American society.
With the increased crime rate, expanded incidence of drunk driving,
and intensified use of narcotics, the number of automobile searches has
increased dramatically; however, this only partially explains the controversy over police authority to make warrantless searches. The courts,
as well as policemen who conduct the searches and laymen whose cars
are searched, have had difficulty comprehending the law in this area.
The complexity of the warrantless automobile search is best understood when evaluated in light of other warrantless searches.
The fourth amendment, which provides the constitutional authority under which the validity of automobile searches must be determined, was drafted and adopted' before the car was invented and when
the existing means of transportation did not play as vital a role in
recreation, commerce and crime. Thus, the law of search and seizure
evolved when the historical concept of protecting a man's castle was
preeminent. 2 This concept was never historically applicable to vehicles
and, therefore, the courts had difficulty extending the standards developed for stationary objects to automobiles.3 Compounding the
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I The Bill of Rights, which includes the fourth amendment, became effective on
November 3, 1791.
2 This was recognized in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
Resistance to these practices [writs of assistance and general warrants] had
established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the
Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by
any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.
3 Murray & Aitken, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 LOYOLA
U.L.A.L. REV. 95, 95 (1970).
Furthermore, this problem was compounded by the development of the exclusionary
rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule was only in existence for
a ten year period when the Supreme Court was faced with Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1924), in which the mobility concept was first enunciated.
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problem created by the car's mobility is its use as an instrumentality
of crime, either as a get-away car or a carrier of contraband; or as the
fruit of the crime itself. 4 As a result, no coherent and logical policy has
evolved.
The language of the fourth amendment does not specifically express the extent of its applicability:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ5
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
As a precondition to a search, the amendment has traditionally been
interpreted to require a warrant" with the exception of certain specific
instances:
(1) consent searches;
(2) searches incident to arrest;
(3) emergency searches to prevent the destruction of evidence or
danger to police officers or other persons; and
(4) hot pursuit.
The consent search exception applies when a person with standing
to consent, 7 intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily8 permits law
In State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 322, 288 A.2d 849, 851 (1972), the court stated:
[A]n automobile is different from a dwelling. To begin with, the power to
search must be equal to the distinctive threat of this mobile instrumentality of
crime.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6 The historical basis for the warrant requirement has been noted by the Supreme
Court:
The people of the United States insisted on writing the Fourth Amendment
into the Constitution because sad experience had taught them that the right to
search and seize should not be left to the mere discretion of the police, but
should as a matter of principle be subjected to the requirement of previous
judicial sanction wherever possible.
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709-10 (1948).
Before a warrant is issued there must be a decision by a judge or magistrate based on
the affiant's oath or affirmation demonstrating that probable cause exists for its issuance.
The search warrant must be specific as to the items to be searched for and the person or
place to be searched. See FED. R. Cium. P. 41; N.J.R. 3:5-1 et seq. See generally Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958);
United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Ebron, 61 N.J. 207, 294
A.2d 1 (1972); State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972).
7 Precisely who has standing to consent has been the source of considerable litigation.
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (desk clerk cannot consent to search of room of
guest in hotel); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord cannot consent
to search of tenants' premises); Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964),
cert, denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965) (wife can consent for husband); State v. Shephard, 255
4
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enforcement officers to conduct a search.0 The operative rationale is
the belief that an individual has the right to make a binding judgment
concerning his own affairs.
The search incident to an arrest exception arises when the police
search the arrested person and anything under his immediate control
in order to discover weapons, prevent the suspect's escape, and stop
destruction or concealment of evidence. 10
The emergency search exception recognizes that when there is
apparent danger to the police officers, or a danger that evidence will
be destroyed, a search may be carried out without a warrant."
The doctrine of hot pursuit provides that police officers in hot
pursuit of a felon can enter the house or building into which the felon
fled without obtaining a warrant in order to search for him and for
concealed weapons which he might utilize in resisting arrest or attempt2
ing escape.'
These four exceptions to the warrant requirement apply to all
searches irrespective of what is to be searched. In addition, two other
Iowa 1218, 124 N.W.2d 712 (1963) (husband can consent for wife). There is conflict as to
whether the driver of a borrowed automobile can consent. Compare United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962), with State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241
(1964). See generally Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1970).
8 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (implied coercion would invalidate the
consent); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960) (burden of proof on state
to show intelligent and freely given consent). There is a dispute as to whether any person
would be willing to consent if he were fully aware of his right not to consent. Compare
United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024 (1966),
with United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963). In
some cases the courts have required some kind of formal Miranda type warnings of the
right to refuse to consent. United States v. Fisher, 329 F. Supp. 630 (D. Minn. 1971);
United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Blalock, 255
F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Contra, United States v. Menke, No. 72-1319 (3d Cir., Oct. 4,
1972); Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967); State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116,
427 P.2d 616 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 308 (1968). But see Rosenthall v. Henderson,
389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968) (failure to advise of right not to consent is only one element to
be considered in determining whether consent was voluntary).
9 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d
962 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965).
10 E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin
and has long been an integral part of the law-enforcement procedures of the
United States and of the individual states.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
11 E.g., State v. Cox, 114 N.J. Super. 556, 277 A.2d 551 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 58
N.J. 93, 275 A.2d 149 (1971); see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
12 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d
616 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 308 (1968).
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exceptions have also developed which are uniquely applicable to the
13
search of the automobile: (1) the search based on probable cause
and (2) the inventory. 14 The mobility of the automobile arguably
necessitated a warrantless search based on probable cause. 15 The inventory, an examination of a car in police custody and an accounting
of the car parts and its contents, was developed to avoid loss to the
owner and to protect the police against fraudulent claims. 16
Unfortunately, because of the difficulty in delineating the various
exceptions, the courts have often failed to clearly specify the exception
upon which their decision is based. The search incident to arrest is
the exception most frequently confused with the specific automobile
search exceptions.
The Supreme Court first discussed the "search-incident" rule in
dictum in Weeks v. United States1'7 in 1914 and, most recently, in
Chimel v. California,' decided in 1969. The Court's treatment of this
issue in the years between Weeks and Chimel does not stand as a
model of judicial consistency or clarity. Cases decided only a few years
apart are in hopeless contradiction, having subjected the rule to
sudden contractions and expansions. 19
13 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14 Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967).
15 See pp. 112-32 infra.
16 See pp. 133-44 inIra.
17 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court noted a right which was
always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of
the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences
of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases.
Id. at 392.
18 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
19 In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court extended the Weeks
reference to search of the person incident to valid arrest to include things under his
control:
When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his
person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be
used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
The language in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), allows a search of the
place where the arrest took place:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons
lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime . . .
is not to be doubted.
Id. at 30. The Court did, however, reject the argument that the right to search extended
to other places, specifically a house several blocks distant from the place where the
arrest occurred. Id. at 30-31.
In Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), the Court adopted the theory set
forth in the dictum in Agnello that the place of arrest may be searched incident to the
arrest. Id. at 199.
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Rabinowitz v: United States, 20 decided prior to Chimel, permitted
police to conduct warrantless searches of an entire room as "incident"
to the occupant's arrest. Chimel overruled Rabinowitz and severely
restricted the extent of permissible searches, holding that a search
incident to an arrest is limited to a search of the arrested person and
the area immediately surrounding him into which he might reach
to seize a weapon or to conceal or destroy evidence. 21 While Chimel
at least temporarily clarified the law in this area, 22 confusion of the
search incident to arrest doctrine, with the recognized exceptions for
automobile searches, further complicated the development of automobile search law. Although Chimel's facts did not involve an automobile search, its holding is applicable whenever the prosecution seeks to
justify a search of a car as incident to an arrest.
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), restricted somewhat the
scope of the search incident to the arrest by saying it could not be an exploratory search
in the hope of finding evidence.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950), introduced the concept of "immediate control," but held that the
occupant of a four room apartment had the entire apartment under his immediate
control and a search of a room other than the room in which the arrest occurred was
valid.
In 1948, the Supreme Court in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948),
overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), restricted the right to search
incident to arrest. The Court, after discussing the traditional strict requirement that
whenever practicable a warrant must be obtained, stated:
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has
always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent
;necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be something
more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest.
334 U.S. at 708. The Court concluded that there were no circumstances dictating the need
for a search without a warrant.
20 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
21 395 U.S. at 762-63.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification,
therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate
eontrol"--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id.
22 But see United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 921 (1971); People v. Perry, 47 Ill. 2d 402, 266 N.E.2d 330 (1971); People v. Pearson,
126 Ill. App. 2d 166, 261 N.E.2d 519 (1970); State v. McNair, 60 N.J. 8, 285 A.2d 553
(1972).
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23

Prior to Chimel, Preston v. United States held that an automobile
search conducted at the police station subsequent to arrest was too
remote in time and place to be a search incident to that arrest. Yet,
despite the apparently clear decision in Chimel, the courts have continued to wrestle with the problem. It has been suggested that a car's
mobility necessitates the extension of the right to search incident to
arrest.
In Paxton v. United States24 the Indiana Supreme Court said:
Although Chimel and those cases preceding it set out guidelines for the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest, that
scope is somewhat extended where the defendant is arrested while
in an automobile. An extension of the permissible scope as defined
in Chimel may easily be rationalized in such a case on the basis
that an additional element of necessity is interjected, namely the
mobility of the automobile ....25
The cases, however, have generally held that once the car doors
are closed and the arrested person has left the car's vicinity, a search
would not be permitted if the arrested person made no attempt to reopen it, or was securely restrained by the arresting officer. 26 Despite
the language concerning the mobility of the car, even Paxton accepts
27
this general principle.
28
In In re Kiser, the search-incident exception was extended to
include a search under a blanket in the back seat of the automobile.
The court reasoned that the defendant, under arrest by several officers,
was "standing within leaping range of the guns in the back seat."2 9 This
case seems to evade the spirit of Chimel.30
The courts, unfortunately, have not always clearly delineated their
376 U.S. 364 (1964).
23 Ind. Dec. 483, 263 N.E.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
25 Id. at 490, 263 N.E.2d at 640; see pp. 124-26 infra.
26 United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971); State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964); Lawson v. State, 484
P.2d 1337 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1971); Fields v. State, 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App.
1970).
27 23 Ind. Dec. at 492, 263 N.E.2d at 641.
28 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969).
29 Id. at 1137.
30 See United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971) (apparently holding
that Chimel is limited to its facts, namely a search of a home, and thus has no relevance
to a car search). The court stated:
The law seems to be well settled that when the driver of a motor vehicle is
lawfully arrested in the vehicle, the arresting officer has the right to search the
vehicle contemporaneously with and as an incident to the lawful arrest, the
vehicle being a thing "under the accused's immediate control."
Id. at 1192 (quoting from Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1963)).
23

24
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reliance upon the search-incident; probable cause, or inventory exceptions. In Adams v. Williams,31 the Court, after justifying the validity
of a police officer's stop and frisk of an automobile and its driver on
the basis of Terry v. Ohio3 2 gave limited consideration to the subsequent search of the automobile, failing to clearly set forth its grounds
for justifying the search.
One further constitutional consideration permeates the confusing
area of automobile searches. The "plain view" doctrine33 permits
police officers acting legally to seize any evidence of a crime that can
be seen by them in plain view. 34 Thus, if a police officer legitimately
stops a car, 35 any evidence he sees may be constitutionally seized.
This paper will examine in detail the historical development of
warrantless automobile search exceptions-probable cause and inven31

407 U.S. 143 (1972).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33 In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968), the Court stated:
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure ....
Accord, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d
371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 56, 243 A.2d 240, 252 (1968).
See Murray & Aitken, supra note 3, at 98.
34 "Plain view" has been held to include that which is revealed by shining a
flashlight into a car at night. E.g., Williams v. United States, 404 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1968); People v. Cacioppo, 264 Cal. App. 2d 392, 70 Cal. Rptr. 356 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
State v. Griffin, 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856 (App. Div. 1964).
35 Car searches arise out of so many different factual situations that the courts have
often confused the discussions of the validity of an arrest or stop with the validity of an
auto search that took place later.
iThe courts have consistently upheld the validity of a stop for a license and registration check. E.g., United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1972); State v. Kabayama,
98 N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (App. Div. 1967), afj'd, 52 N.J. 507, 246 A.2d 714 (1968);
see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-29 (1961). A police officer has the right to stop a car for a
traffic violation, but such a stop does not justify a search. State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super.
427, 202 A.2d 448 (App. Div. 1964); Lawson v. State, 484 P.2d 1337 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App.
1971); Roberts v. State, 483 P.2d 338 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1971); Baker & Khourie, Improbable Cause-The Poisonous Fruits of a Search After Arrest for a Traffic Violation, 25
OKLA. L. REV. 54 (1972). However, after the stop, independent information might develop
which would create probable cause for a search. State v. Campbell, 53 N.J. 230, 250
A.2d 1 (1969); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141 (1967); see Note, Searches of the
Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1969). An exception may
occur if the violation is for drunk driving or driving while drugged; then the officers
may search for liquor or drugs (naturally assuming probable cause). People v. Jackson,
241 Cal. App. 2d 189, 50 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); State v. Boone, 114 N.J. Super.
521, 277 A.2d 414 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 58 N.J. 595, 279 A.2d 680 (1971); State v.
Cusick, 110 N.J. Super. 149, 264 A.2d 735 (App. Div. 1970). Police may stop cars at a
roadblock. United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Moreover, a car
may be stopped if police have reasonable suspicion of criminal. activity. Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Boone, 114
N.J. Super. 521, 277 A.2d 414 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 58 N.J. 595, 279 A.2d 680 (1971).
32
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tory-and will demonstrate how the different exceptions to the warrant requirement have been merged, confused, and misused.
HISTORY OF THE CAR SEARCH DOCTRINE

The "car search" doctrine owes its birth and development to the
National Prohibition Act (the Volstead Act). Anticipating that motor
vehicles would play a necessary part in any large-scale violations of the
Act, Congress set up a warrant requirement scheme that clearly distinguished between searches of buildings and searches of vehicles. The
Act required a warrant to search a private home, but imposed no such
restriction upon searches of moveable objects, including automobiles. 86
In the early 1920's, several federal district and circuit courts
wrestled with the unique problems inherent in warrantless searches
and seizures of vehicles believed to be carrying illegal liquor. The
majority view was that such searches did not violate the fourth amendment. The mobility of the automobile, however, was not clearly
developed as a basis for justifying a warrantless search. Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Ash v.
United States,37 did specifically recognize mobility as rendering "im38
practicable" the "usual formality of procuring a search warrant,"
it can be considered an exception. Other courts justified the automobile search as a search incident to the "arrest" of the car itself for the
offense of transporting liquor.8 9 The auto search was also upheld as
86 National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. II, § 25, 41 Stat. 315 (repealed 1935) provided
in part:
No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as
such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless

it is in part used for some business purpose ....
On the other hand, ch. 85, tit. II, § 26, 41 Stat. 315, did not mention a warrant in

providing:
[A]ny officer of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting
in violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile,

water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any and all
intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law.
The Act enhanced the vehicle-building distinction with respect to warrants by virtue

of the Stanley Amendment, ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 223 (repealed 1935), which provided that
any federal employee engaged in enforcement of the Prohibition Act or its amendments
would be guilty of a misdemeanor if he shall search "any private dwelling" or "without
a search warrant maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or
property."
87 299 F. 277 (4th Cir. 1924).
88 Id. at 278-79.
89 E.g., United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1922).
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simply authorized by a statutory scheme that was similar to older,
unchallenged laws permitting warrantless searches of vessels or vehicles
40
for illegally possessed goods.
Implicit in these opinions was the twofold recognition that (a)
it would be difficult or impossible in car search situations to obtain a
warrant because the car could be moved, and (b) a car is not entitled to
the same degree of protection from government search as is a dwelling.
However, while these early opinions may have considered mobility
in permitting warrantless automobile searches, the same courts also
41
upheld warrantless entries and searches of non-residential buildings.
Although the car-search exception was statutorily recognized, some
early opinions appeared to confuse it with, or consider it identical to,
the apparently ancient, but federally underdeveloped, doctrine of
search incident to arrest.42 Contributing to the confusion between the
vehicle search and the incident-to-arrest exceptions was the fact that
automobile bootleg searches most often occurred at the place where
the car was stopped and the driver arrested.
Courts that treated the warrantless automobile search as simply
incident to the "arrest" of the offending car took a more ingenious,
albeit artificial, approach. This "offending automobile" view was
analogous to the old common law and Biblical view that an inanimate
40 Park v. United States, 294 F. 776 (1st Cir. 1924). This case involved cooperation
between state and federal officers in seizing and searching a bootlegger's vehicle. The
court examining the legality of the search under both state and federal law, noted
several state cases from New England applying state statutes that provided for warrantless
searches of illegally possessed or used goods. Id. at 780-83. See also United States v.
Bateman, 278 F. 231 (S.D. Cal. 1922) (dictum indicating the finding of liquor justifies
the search).
41 McBride v. United States, 284 F. 416 (5th Cir. 1922); Kathriner v. United States,
276 F. 808 (9th Cir. 1921).
42 Lambert v. United States, 282 F. 413 (9th Cir. 1922); United States v. Kaplan, 286
F. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923).
While the right to make a warrantless search of an arrested person incident to his
valid arrest was apparently long recognized in America and England, it was not discussed
by the Supreme Court until 1914, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where
recognized in dictum. Id. at 392. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), marked the
next time the Court discussed searches incident to arrest. The dissenting Justices in this
case treated the search of Carroll's automobile as incident to his arrest, which they
considered invalid. Id. at 168-69 (McReynolds, J., joined by Sutherland, J., dissenting). The
majority briefly explained the search incident to arrest doctrine, but stated that this case
did not turn on it. 267 U.S. at 158-59. The erratic development of this doctrine in the years
that followed, in which the permissible search area was subject to sudden contractions
and expansions (see note 19 supra), indicates that it was not a doctrine to which the
courts had devoted much thought.
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object could be an offender.4 3 It did, however, have the advantage of
separating the validity of the car search from the legality of the occupants' arrest.
.But, whether the search of the auto was treated as incident to the
occupants' arrest or as part of -the "arrest" of the -offending vehicle
itself, the dependence of the search upon the validity of the "arrest"
raised serious problems in Volstead Act cases. 44 It was, of course, wellestablished that an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor could
be made only for a breach of the peace or for an offense actually committed in the officer's presence; mere probable cause based on sources
of information other than the officer's own senses would not suffice. 45
Since a first or second offense of transporting liquor in violation of
the Volstead Act was only a misdemeanor, no arrest could be made
unless the offense was actually committed in the officer's presence.
This problem was recognized by Judge Anderson, dissenting in
Park v. United States46 from the first circuit's approval of a warrantless
automobile search by state and federal officials who arrested the occupants on the basis of information received from another source. Judge
Anderson contended that section 26 of the Act did nothing to change
the warrant requirement for misdemeanor arrests. 4T All it did, he said,
was to permit the warrantless arrest of a person whom an officer per
sonally "shall discover in the act"48 of transporting liquor, and to
authorize a warrantless seizure of the arrested person's vehicle. This,
Judge Anderson contended, did not mean "shall have reasonable cause
to suspect or believe." 49 Therefore, the officer should have to personally
observe, smell, or otherwise discover the liquor with his senses before
he could make a bootlegging arrest and search incident to that arrest.
Although Judge Anderson treated the car search as incident to
the driver's arrest, his objection to warrantless misdemeanor arrests
would also cover treatment of the car as the object of the arrest. Since
an offending car was subject to forfeiture, 50 it was highly unlikely that
43 United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 966, 1005-06 (S.D. Tex. 1922).

44 The rule that an officer could not make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest except
for an offense actually committed in his presence "has been so frequently decided as not
to require citation of authority." Snyder v. United States, 285 F. 1, 2 (4th Cir. 1922). See
Mr. Justice McReynolds' compilation of authorities in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
at 164-65.
45 Park v. United States, 294 F. 776, 784 (Ist Cir. 1924) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 788.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. 11, § 26, 41 Stat. 315 (repealed 1935).
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any car found illegally transporting liquor was anything but a misdemeanant. Most of the cases involved searches based, in part at least,
on information obtained by means other than observation. Thus, if
auto searches were dependent upon the arrest of the occupant or
vehicle, either traditional restrictions on misdemeanor arrests would
have to be lifted or these warrantless searches could not be permitted.
The Mobility Concept
These problems were resolved by Carroll v. United States51 in

which the Supreme Court for the first time considered the legality,
52
under the fourth amendment, of a seizure of goods in transport.
The Court clearly recognized the authority of Congress, consistent with
the fourth amendment, to permit warrantless searches of Vehicles or
vessels where a warrantless search of a building would be unconstitutional.5 3 Prohibition agents stopped an automobile driven by individuals whom the agents knew from previous personal dealings to be
bootleggers. The agents searched the vehicle, without a warrant, on
the highway where they had stopped it. They discovered contraband
liquor concealed behind the back seat.
In interpreting the Volstead Act's search provisions, the Supreme
Court articulated the hitherto undeveloped "mobility" concept as permitting a special exception to the warrant requirement. The Court
concluded that a vehicle may be searched without a warrant on the
basis of probable cause to believe that it contains the contraband
sought, independent of any authority to arrest the vehicle's driver or
occupants. 54 Chief Justice Taft based this mobility concept on powerful statutory precedent: less stringent warrant requirements for searches
of vessels than for searches of buildings were set forth by the country's
first statute regulating the collection of duties, the Act of 1789. 55
Furthermore, this law was passed by the same Congress that proposed
the adoption of the fourth amendment.
To satisfy the Carroll test, officers must have probable cause to
believe that a readily moveable vehicle conceals contraband or illegally
possessed goods. Under this rule, given probable cause to believe a
vehicle contains contraband, authority to search it without a warrant
exists independent of any arrest. By formulating a car-search exception
51 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Id. at 149.
W Id. at 156.
54 Id. at 153-59.
55 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. Chief Justice Taft noted several other
statutorily authorized searches and seizures. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53
(1924).
52
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to the warrant requirement that had a life of its own independent of
the incident-to-arrest exception, the Court neatly avoided the conflict
pointed out by Judge Anderson between warrantless vehicle searches
under the Volstead Act, and the traditional warrant requirement for
misdemeanor arrests. Officers armed with probable cause, but without
a warrant, could search a car and, upon perceiving with their own
senses the evidence of the offense, arrest the occupant without a warrant for a misdemeanor.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, who was joined in dissent by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, did not discuss the automobile search as having its own
independent validity, but treated it as dependent upon the legality
of the arrest.5 6 The Volstead Act, he emphasized, did not authorize a
warrantless misdemeanor arrest upon suspicion, and the agents did not
57
have probable cause to stop the car and arrest its occupants.
In firmly establishing the constitutionality of warrantless automobile searches, the Carroll Court was not faced with two problems that
were to later cause much difficulty. The automobile search in Carroll
was carried out pursuant to a statute. What of a warrantless automobile
search without statutory authorization? Furthermore, the vehicle in
Carrollwas on the open highway and was in motion when stopped. It
was searched immediately at the scene. But what of a delayed search, or
a search of a vehicle not in motion when seized?
Another problem created by developments subsequent to Carroll
concerns the "mere evidence rule." Both the Volstead Act and the
Act of 1789 provided for forfeiture of any goods found to be held
in violation of the law. 58 In Carroll,the Chief Justice, relying on Boyd
v. United States,59 emphasized that searches for items which the government is entitled to possess are totally different from a search for, and
seizure of, a man's private books and papers "for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence
against him." 60 However, Carroll's treatment of items subject to forfeiture as different from personal papers, was based in part on Boyd's
reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination and upon the mere
evidence rule as spelled out in Gouled v. United States.61
U.S. at 163-75.
57 However, it is interesting to note the weight that Mr. Justice McReynolds would
have apparently been willing to give Congressional authority to search on less than
probable cause. "When Congress has intended that seizures or arrests might be made
upon suspicion it has been careful to say so." Id. at 174-75.
58 See notes 50 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
59 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
60 Id. at 623.
61 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Under the "mere evidence" rule as developed in Gouled,
56 267
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Did the demise of the mere evidence rule more than forty years
later in Warden v. Hayden6 2 mean that an automobile could now be
searched without a warrant, under the mobility doctrine, for mere
evidence of a crime as well as for contraband? If so, did Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,63 decided three years later, resurrect the mere evidence rule with respect to automobile searches?
From the Carroll decision in 1925 until the announcement of
Preston v. United States6 4 in 1964, the handful of Supreme Court
cases that involved warrantless automobile searches extended Carroll's
reasoning to slightly different fact situations, and, without going into
Carroll in depth or altering any part of it, they arguably answered a
few of the major questions that it had left open.
New Problems, Some Answers
Six years after Carroll, the Court, in Husty v. United States,
unanimously upheld the warrantless search of a bootlegger's automobile by agents who, armed with probable cause to believe the car contained contraband liquor, had staked it out as it sat parked on a public
street. The agents moved in on it only when it was being driven away.
They then searched it on the spot. It was reasonable, the Court noted,
for the officers to stakeout the car and wait as they did. Under the
circumstances, it was just not practicable to obtain a warrant.16
Husty is an interesting case in that the mobility factor was not
nearly as strong as it was in Carroll.The agents had probable cause to
search the car when they saw it, at a time when it was neither moving
nor occupied. True, as the Court pointed out, the bootleggers could
have approached the car to drive it away at any time, and the agents
would have reduced their on-the-scene manpower by sending one of
their number for a warrant. But it is at least arguable that the agents'
stakeout sharply reduced or eliminated the possibility that the car
could be removed while a warrant was being obtained.
Read broadly, Husty could stand for the proposition that, given
evidence in which the defendant's right of possession was superior to the government's
could not be lawfully seized. It had to be returned to the defendant and could not be
used against him in a criminal proceeding. In other words, if an item or thing was
"mere evidence," the government had no right even under authority of warrant to take it
from a person and use it against him. On the other hand, if the item was contraband or
the fruit or instrumentality of a crime, so that the government's interest in it was
paramount, then it could be seized.
62 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
63 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
64 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
65 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
66
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even potential mobility, law enforcement officers simply need not
obtain a warrant even where they have the opportunity to do so. Read
more narrowly, it appears to say that the vehicle need not be moving
at the time probable cause to search it is established in order to qualify
as "mobile."
In the next automobile search case considered by the Court,
Scher v. United States,6 7 the vehicle was actually parked when searched.
The car had just pulled into a garage after being followed from the
scene of a stakeout by federal officers. This search took place after the
repeal of the eighteenth amendment, and there was no indication in
the Court's opinion that it was carried out pursuant to specific statutory
authority. The Court relied upon Carroll without any reference to an
authorizing statute.
However, the value of the Scher opinion as auto search precedent
is somewhat clouded. In concluding that "[t]he officers did nothing
either unreasonable or oppressive," the Court referred to two post-Carroll cases involving searches incident to arrest.6 8 Furthermore, the

cloud is darkened somewhat by the fact that the opinion was written
by Mr. Justice McReynolds who appeared to assume in his Carroll
dissent that the auto search there depended upon the validity of the
arrest. However, the occupants of the Scher vehicle had neither been
placed under arrest nor ostensibly detained at the time of the search,
and nowhere in his opinion did Mr. Justice McReynolds ever discuss
the search as incident to any "arrest."
The last pre-Preston Supreme Court case to deal with a car search,
Brinegar v. United States,69 focused on the question of whether the
searching officers had probable cause. However, Brinegar is of interest
for what the majority assumed, as well as for what the three dissenting
Justices said about Carroll. The majority described the facts of the
case as similar to Carroll,but as in Scher, there was no mention of any
statute authorizing a warrantless vehicle search. In finding that the
officers had probable cause, the majority simply assumed -that they did
not need a warrant.
Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion for the three dissenting Justices
attached great significance to the fact that the Carroll search was authorized by statute, while no such authority existed here.
The Court is voluntarily dispensing with warrant in this case as
305 U.S. 251 (1938).
id. at 255. These references were to Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925);
and Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F.2d 825, 826 (6th Cir. 1931).
69 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
67
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matter of judicial policy, while in the Carroll case the Court could
have required a warrant only by holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional. 70
Thus the post-Carroll Supreme Court cases dealing with searches of
automobiles kept Carroll's-distinction between searches of buildings
and searches of vehicles clearly in mind.
However, judicial resistance to the idea that a warrantless car search
could be justified on its own merits, independent of an arrest, had
surfaced in lower federal court opinions, prior to Carroll,71 in the
Carroll dissent, 72 and in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Brinegar.73
Justices McReynolds and Sutherland, dissenting in Carroll, insisted
upon tying the search to Carroll's arrest; and the three dissenting
Justices in Brinegar appeared ready to at least limit Carroll to cases
involving statutory authorization. This hostility toward allowing officers to search automobiles on the basis of their notions of probable
cause was motivated by the fear that this power would be abused. The
Brinegar dissenters, in fact, claimed that this abuse had materialized.
Carroll, they claimed, was routinely being used to make searches on
74
mere suspicion.
The Court's problem in coming to grips with potential and actual
abuses of Carrollintensified with the application, in 1961, of the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule to state prosecutions. 7 5 State and local
officials, whose searches and seizures had been previously governed
only by state laws and constitutional requirements, now had to meet
relatively stringent fourth amendment standards. The courts were
faced with the problem of applying fourth amendment standards to
police activities that differed markedly from the investigatory and
regulatory work that characterized federal law enforcement. It is noteworthy that all six of the "modern" Supreme Court car-search cases
involved searches by state or local officials.
The first major twist in the car search doctrine came with Preston
v. United States. 76 Police responded at 3 a.m. to a complaint that
three men had been sitting for five hours in a parked car in the business district. The officers asked the men what they were doing there
70 Id.
omitted).
71 See
72 See
73 See

at 183 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter & Murphy, JJ., dissenting) (footnote

75

note 45 supra and accompanying text.
note 56 supra and accompanying text.
note 70 supra and accompanying text.
338 U.S. at 183.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

76

376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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and received an unsatisfactory answer. The men had twenty-five cents
among them. The officers arrested them for vagrancy and had the car
towed to a garage. The officers searched the car thoroughly soon after
the men had been "booked," and found burglars' tools and getaway
apparatus that led to a federal prosecution for conspiracy to rob a
bank.
The Court voted unanimously to reverse Preston's conviction on
the ground that the warrantless search was unreasonable. But, in reaching this result, the Court, confronted with the government's argument
that this warrantless search was reasonable because it was incident to
arrest, declared that the search could not be justified on this ground;
it was too remote in time and place from the arrest. 77 Preston did not
refer to Carroll's clear statement that the validity of a car search could
be established independently of any arrest. It is, thus, not clear whether
the Court was disregarding this statement or merely recognizing factual
distinctions.
The Court had several bases for distinguishing Carroll without
casting doubt upon the thrust of its holding. It could have severely
limited Carroll by pointing out that the warrantless search there was
specifically authorized by statute. It could be argued that without explicit statutory authorization, as provided by the Volstead Act, such a
broad exception to the warrant requirement should not be judicially
approved. Of course, this would have required a review of Husty and
Brinegar,but neither of these cases dealt with statutory authorizations.
Perhaps a more solid basis for distinction was the fact that when
the Preston car was under police control and no longer readily moveable at the time it was searched, while Carroll's car was searched on
the highway, at a time when it had not been secured. The narrowestand perhaps soundest-basis for declaring the Preston search unconstitutional was that the police simply had no probable cause to believe
it contained any evidence of crime. 78 Indeed, this was the way Preston
was subsequently interpreted in Cooper v. California79 and Chambers
80
v. Maroney.
The incident-to-arrest posture, in which Preston was presented and
decided, raised a host of problems for law enforcement officers that
77 Id. at 368.
7s However, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, went out of his way to avoid
resolving the case on the absence of probable cause. He assumed probable cause, and then,
despite his reference to the less stringent warrant requirement for vehicle searches, treated
the problem as one of a search incident to arrest. This incident-to-arrest reasoning was
similar to Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissent in Carroll.
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
80 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
79
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either were not problems at all under Carroll, or had seemingly been
resolved by the Court's post-Carrollopinions:
(1) Should a warrant be obtained to search an automobile that
is unoccupied, but not abandoned, when the police approach it with
probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime? In Husty,
the Court excused the failure to get a warrant in this kind of a situation, although the search did not take place until after the car was occupied and in motion.
(2) What if the police have probable cause to search the vehicle
but not to arrest the driver? The opportunity to search could very
well be too fleeting to obtain a warrant, and yet, if the search were
tied to the arrest, no search at all could take place.
(3) Is a warrantless highway search valid if the driver is still
present but has been secured and personally searched?
(4) What effect would limiting the permissible scope of a search
incident to arrest have on an officer's authority to search the entire
car, as the agents did in Carroll, without a warrant?
The last two questions point to the fact that, under the Preston
approach, authority of officers to make warrantless car searches would
be at the mercy of the considerable complexities of the incident-toarrest rule. This dependence created acute problems when Chimel v.
California"' emphatically limited permissible searches incident to arrest
to the area within the arrested person's immediate reach.
If Preston did violence to the reasoning in Carroll, its turn to have
82
violence done to it came soon thereafter in Cooper v. California.
Cooper involved the search of a drug defendant's impounded automobile about a week after his arrest. The auto was being held in a
garage pending forfeiture proceedings under a state law that made a
car used in the transportation of drugs an instrumentality of the
crime. 83 Heroin was found in the glove compartment. The California
Court of Appeals felt bound by Preston and held that the search was
unreasonable, but went on to hold that the admission of the heroin
84
at trial was harmless error.

The Supreme Court did not reach the harmless error point; five
Justices voted to uphold the search as reasonable. The Court correctly
noted that in Preston the government sought to justify the search
primarily on incident-to-arrest grounds. Alternatively, the government
81 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
82 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
83 Act of April 7, 1939, ch. 60, § 11611, [1939] Cal. Laws 767, as amended, Act of
February 23, 1940, ch. 9, § 34, [1941] Cal. Laws 23 (repealed 1972).
84 234 Cal. App. 2d 587, 44 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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had argued- that the search was justified because there was probable
cause to believe the car was stolen. "But," Mr. Justice Black, the author
of the-Preston opinion, wrote for the Court in Cooper,
the police arrested Preston for vagrancy . . . and no claim was
made that the police had authority to hold his car on that charge.
The search was therefore to be treated as though his car was in
his own or his agent's possession, safe from intrusions by the police
or anyone else. The situation involving petitioner's car is quite
different. 85
In Preston, Mr. Justice Black correctly noted that the fact that
the police had custody of the car was totally unrelated to the charge
for which its occupants were arrested. But he neglected to mention
that Preston had assumed probable cause to search the car for evidence
of its theft.
This particular search, he said, although not incident to arrest,
was reasonable on other grounds. Under California law, the car, because it was involved in narcotics transportation, was to be held as
evidence until forfeiture proceedings were conducted or a release
ordered. While the statute did not expressly authorize the car search,
[i]t would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to
retain the car . . .had no right, even for their own protection, to
search it86
The Court then added that
[i]t is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search
warrant, for "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.''87
In that the seizure was statutorily authorized and the car subject
to forfeiture, Cooper was similar to Carroll. However, in that the car
was not searched until long after if was immobilized, it was more like
Preston. The net effect of the holding was to recognize anew that
there is a separate and distinct car search exception to the warrant
requirement, notwithstanding the considerable doubt that had been
cast upon it by Preston. But it left open the question whether a warrantless car search, not authorized by statute, is permissible independent of arrest. Furthermore, the search in this case, as depicted by the
Court, bore some resemblance to an inventory, a police practice raising
386 U.S. at 60.
86 Id. at 61-62.
87 Id. at 62 (quoting from United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950), which
was overruled in this respect by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), just three years
•
after Cooper).
85
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fourth amendment problems that the Court has thus far expressly
avoided."s The Court noted that it would be unreasonable to bar a
search by the police even for their own protection-an observation unrelated to its emphasis on the relationship between the arrest and search.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the four dissenters, pointed out
that the Preston car was also in lawful custody at the time it was
searched. The mere fact that the Cooper car would, at some subsequent
date, become subject to forfeiture proceedings did not mean that the
state would then have retroactive title to it. This case, he maintained,
was on all fours with Preston. Mr. Justice Douglas saw only two ways
in which the holding could be explained. One was that it overruled
Preston sub silentio, and he made it clear that, as far as he was concerned, Preston,properly limited warrantless car searches to those that
could be characterized as incident to arrest. The alternative ground was
that a watered-down version of the fourth amendment applies to the
states. He rejected this view and it has not, since the incorporation of
the fourth amendment, been adhered to by the Court. s9
Within a two-year period, the Court had announced two separate
automobile search doctrines, irreconcilable and inconsistent with past
holdings. Preston, on the one hand, obscured Carroll'smajor contribution to fourth amendment law-the warrantless car search justified by
the vehicle's mobility, existing independently of any arrest authority.
Cooper, on the other hand, not only misconstrued Preston, but, by
upholding a search where there was no conceivable exigency that made
it impracticable to get a warrant, exhibited a permissiveness toward
warrantless searches beyond anything contemplated in Carroll. Of
course, this permissiveness was predicated not only on the close relationship between the arrest and the object of the search, but also a
state forfeiture statute-a strange basis indeed for relaxing a constitutional requirement.
It is not surprising that state and lower federal court treatment
of automobile searches was characterized by confusion. The tendency
was to simply treat searches of arrested suspects' automobiles as incident to the suspects' arrest.90
A few courts continued to recognize the Carroll mobility doctrine
as a basis, independent of any authority to search incident to arrest,
for warrantless automobile searches, but they appear to have been in
88 See pp. 133-34 infra.
89 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S.'752 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Cockfield, 431 Pa. 639, 246 A.2d 381 (1968).
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the minority."' Thus, when the permissible scope of searches incident
to arrest was cut back severely by Chimel, the consequences for traditional police searches of automobiles were dramatic indeed. Searches,
that would even have been perfectly reasonable under Preston, were
invalid. Cooper, which had been boldly utilized by some courts to cut
back Preston's restrictions, had to be viewed as limited to its facts, for
92
subsequent courts relied on Preston.
Chimel and its Aftermath
In announcing Chimel's strict limitations on searches incident to
arrest, Mr. Justice Stewart referred to Preston's refusal to extend this
doctrine to a search that "is remote in time or place from the arrest."9 3
This affirmation that Preston was indeed based upon the search incident to arrest doctrine was reflected in numerous subsequent opinions
declaring unreasonable any warrantless car search made after the defendant had been separated from his vehicle-even though relatively
94
little time had elapsed since the arrest.
Chimel's impact on car-search law is particularly ironic in view
of footnote 9 in which Mr. Justice Stewart squarely reaffirmed the
mobility exception set forth in Carroll:
Our holding today is of course entirely consistent with the
recognized principle that, assuming the existence of probable cause,
automobiles and other vehicles may be searched without warrants
"where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." 95
Not all the lower courts merged the car-search and incident-toarrest doctrines. One particularly perceptive post-Chimel opinion, by
Judge Ely of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
91 See, People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580 (1967); State v. Fish, 280 Minn.
156, 159 N.W.2d 786 (1968).
92 See, e.g., Leven v. United States, 260 A.2d 681 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Reyes,
81 N.M. 404, 467 P.2d 730 (1970).
A particularly interesting application of Preston as a search-incident case was made
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which held that Preston
forbade a warrantless search incident to arrest in a home that extended beyond the
accused's immediate control. United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971). However, other federal courts have kept dear the doctrinal
distinction between searches incident to arrest and searches of mobile vehicles. Ramon v.
Cupp, 423 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Lewis, 303 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D.N.Y.

1969).
98 395 U.S. at 764 (quoting from Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
94 See cases cited note 92 supra.
95 395 U.S. at 764 n.9 (quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1924)).
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recognized that "[t]he theory upon which the search has previously
been upheld is somewhat hybrid, arising from two types of justifications
recognized by the Supreme Court."9 6 After setting forth the Chimel
rule, Judge Ely continued:
In addition, if the officers had probable cause to believe that the
automobile was being used at that time to transport contraband
and if procuring a search warrant might afford opportunity for
quick removal of the vehicle from the jurisdiction, 9then
such
7
exigent circumstances will justify a warrantless search.
Such "exigent circumstances" do not exist when both car and
suspect are in custody, Judge Ely concluded, citing Preston. He thus
demonstrated that he was a better analyst than prophet, for Chambers
v. Maroney9 s held otherwise just four months later.
Mr. Justice White's dissent in Chimel set forth a more relaxed
view of the warrant requirement, diametrically opposed to Mr. Justice
Stewart's. 99 This view was to underlie his opinion for the Court in
Chambers the following year.
In the four-year interval between Cooper and Chambers, the
Court decided two cases involving evidence taken from automobiles.
In a per curiam opinion, it resolved the first case, Harris v. United
States,100 on a plain view basis without finding it necessary to shed
further light on the warrant requirement.
1°1 a shot was
In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.,
fired at a home from a passing car. The sheriff pursued a "suspicious
car" that police in another town subsequently stopped for speeding.
The car's occupants were taken to jail, and, while the car was parked
outside the jail, officers searched it and found an air gun. The search
was declared unreasonable. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Ramon v. Cupp, 423 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id.
98 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
99 In Mr. Justice White's view, the arrest in Chimel created exigent circumstances
that justified a further warrantless search of the arrested man's house for evidence that
the officers had probable cause to believe was hidden there. 395 U.S. at 770-83 (White, J.,
joined by Black, J., dissenting). The officers' lawful presence to make a valid arrest justified
a warrantless search based upon probable cause, even though they arguably could have
obtained a warrant before the arrest or could have, by greatly infringing on the freedom
of the defendant's wife, secured the house while a warrant was obtained.
This relaxed view of the warrant requirement is far different from the presumption,
asserted by Mr. Justice Stewart in Chimel and Coolidge, that a warrantless search is invalid and can be justified only by circumstances in which it is truly impracticable to
obtain a warrant.
100 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
101 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
96
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White, recognized three possible justifications for a warrantless automobile search: first, a search incident to arrest; second, a search made
reasonable by a requirement, like the statute in Cooper; and third,
Carroll's recognition that "[a]utomobiles, because of their mobility,
may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrant02
less search of a residence or office."'
The Court found that the search was no more incident to arrest
than the Preston search was, nor could it be justified on the basis of
Cooper because there was no forfeiture question. It further held that
the police had no probable cause for the search, and found it unnecessary to
reach the question whether Carroll and Brinegar ... extend to a

warrantless search, based upon probable cause, of an automobile
which, having been stopped
originally on a highway, is parked
103
outside a courthouse.
The real significance of Dyke was that it clearly distinguished
between the incident-to-arrest basis of Preston and the entirely separate
authority, recognized by Carroll, to conduct a warrantless car search
on the basis of probable cause.
Chambers, Coolidge and Confusion

State and lower federal courts, which had severely restricted permissible automobile searches in view of Preston, opened up in light
of Cooper, and then cut back again as a result of Chimel, were given
a virtual green light by the Court in Chambers. This case, factually
speaking, was different than any that had gone before. But, if the
assumptions in Preston are taken into account, the fact situation was
similar to that case in that the vehicle had been completely immobilized
at the time of the search.
Within an hour of the armed robbery of a service station, officers
arrested four occupants of a station wagon matching the description of
the robbers' car. Two of the occupants matched the descriptions of
the robbers. The vehicle was in motion on the highway at the time
the police stopped it. After the station wagon was driven to the police
station by an officer, it was thoroughly searched whereupon evidence
was discovered.
The Court, in a 7-1 decision, held that the search of the car was
reasonable. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, conceded that
this search could not be justified as incident to arrest, and quoted
102
103

Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
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Preston and Dyke for this proposition. But, referring to Carroll, he
found alternative grounds for justifying the search. It was clearly based
on probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of the
robbery while, conversely, both Preston and Dyke involved situations
in which there was no probable cause to search the car.
Mr. Justice White then proceeded to discuss mobility, clearly the
distinguishing factor between house and vehicle searches. Under Carroll, an automobile's mobility presents an exigent circumstance that,
given probable cause to search it, justifies an exception to the warrant
requirement. "Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.

10

4

But Chambers, of course, did not involve an immediate on-

the-highway search. The occupants and car were safely in custody.
Nevertheless, the Court justified the warrantless search of the in-custody
car by adopting the theory Mr. Justice White expounded in his Chimel
dissent. Some kinds of searches, he said, simply do not require a
warrant because they frequently must be carried out in situations in
which a warrant cannot be obtained. It is arguable whether an immediate search without a warrant is any greater intrusion than immobilization of the car until a warrant is obtained. Which intrusion is
greater "may depend on a variety of circumstances.' 0 5 Mr. Justice
White did acknowledge that not "every conceivable circumstance"', 06
would justify a warrantless car search:
But the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a
particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable;
moreover the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily
moveable. Where this is true . . . either the search must be made

immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and
held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain
a warrant for the search. 107
Thus,
[f]or constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable
cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
10 8
immediate search without a warrant.

Only Mr. Justice Harlan dissented outright. 0 9 Asserting the strict
view that underlay Chimel, he argued that a warrant could be dis399 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
106 Id. at 50.
107 Id. at 50-51 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. at 52.
109 Id. at 55-65 (Harlan, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part).
104
105
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pensed with only when circumstances made it impossible or impracticable to obtain one. He noted that this case went further than the
warrantless highway search for contraband in Carroll; it condoned a
removal of a car for a warrantless search at the convenience of the
police.
An immediate, warrantless search of the vehicle is a far greater
intrusion than merely holding it until a warrant can be obtained, Mr.
Justice Harlan emphasized. The individual has an interest in the
privacy of the automobile. The inconvenience resulting from police
immobilization of the car may be lessened considerably by the fact that
the individual himself is in custody. Furthermore, the individual can
consent to such a search if he considers it a lesser inconvenience than
having the car held until a warrant is obtained.
No legitimate law enforcement interest in preserving evidence or
ensuring safety is served by this case, Mr. Justice Harlan maintained.
The majority's endorsement here of a warrantless invasion of fourth
amendment privacy, where a warrant could be obtained at no risk to
effective law enforcement, is, he pointed out, at odds with the approach
taken in Preston.
A major problem left unresolved by this case---one which was
to divide at least one federal court of appeals in the year to comewas that of a vehicle in custody at the time the officer obtains probable
cause to search it.11 0

The Court's next attempt to introduce some consistency into
car-search law was made in Coolidge v. New Hampshire"' which,
ironically enough, involved a case in which police did have a warrant.
The problem was that the warrant itself was invalid, so that the Court
had to consider the search as a warrantless one. Insofar as it was already
obvious that the officers had had time to obtain a warrant, this search
may have been doomed at the outset.
Manchester, New Hampshire, police officers had obtained invalid
warrants 12 to arrest Coolidge for murder and to search his house and
110 See United States v. Golembiewski, 437 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir, 1971), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 932 (1971). A car with out-of-state license plates was stopped for illegally passing a
school bus. The two occupants were taken to the sheriff's office. While the car was parked
outside, a National Crime Information Center check revealed that a car with the same
registration number was stolen. An FBI agent and a state trooper, searching the car without
a warrant, discovered evidence tending to show that the car's occupants must have known
that the car was stolen. The court held 2-1 that the warrantless search was legal. The
majority relied heavily on Chambers' recognition that the right to search a car rests on a
different and more liberal basis than the right to search a dwelling.
111 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
112 The warrants had been issued by the State Attorney General, who clearly did
not pass the "neutral and detached" test. Id. at 449-53.
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two automobiles. They went to his house and saw the car, which eventually yielded evidence of the crime, parked outside. They arrested
Coolidge and told his wife that she would have to stay elsewhere that
night-they were concerned that she would be harassed by reporters.
Transportation was provided for her.
About two and one half hours after Coolidge had been taken into
police custody, his automobiles were towed to the police station. The
car in question was first searched two days later. Evidence was obtained
tending to show that it was highly likely that the victim had been in
the car and that a gun had been fired inside the automobile.
Because the warrant was invalid, the Court considered the seizure
and subsequent search of the car under the various doctrines permitting
exceptions to the warrant requirement. It found that the seizure and
search did not come under any of these exceptions, including the
automobile search exception.
To apply Carrolland Chambers to the facts of this case, Mr. Justice
Stewart wrote for the Court, would be to extend them far beyond their
original rationale. The Carroll exception was based on an automobile's
actual mobility in a given situation. There was not the "fleeting opportunity" for a search that confronted the officers in Carroll or the
officers in Chambers at the time they actually seized the car. The
majority noted, that after the police had arrived at Coolidge's residence,
there was no way that he or his wife could have gained access to the
car. And prior to their arrival, the police had no reason to believe that
he would move the car or remove evidence. He had already had ample
opportunity to do so.
Coolidge's one clear addition to the car search doctrine was its
limited concept of "mobility" as justification for a warrantless search.
The car had to be "mobile" at the time of seizure to justify either the
kind of search in Carroll or the kind of in-custody search that was
carried out in Chambers. There must be a danger that, if time is taken
to obtain a warrant, evidence will be lost or, at least, a true inconvenience to the police will occur.
Mr. Justice Stewart interpreted Chambers as adding to Carroll
only the refinement that a warrantless search of a mobile car can be
delayed until after the car is at the police station. This case, Mr. Justice
Stewart said, was controlled by Dyke-a case in which, it is interesting
to note, there clearly was no probable cause for the search. In acknowledging this point, Mr. Justice Stewart, nonetheless, went on to add
that in neither Dyke nor this case was there a danger that the car
would be moved.
Because it represents a view of the warrant requirement incon-
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sistent with the Chambers rationale, Coolidge did little to clarify
the car search doctrine; it had quite the opposite effect. This confusion
arises, in part, from Mr. Justice Stewart's comparison of the facts in
this case to those in Carroll."3 At two different places in his opinion,
he listed factors making for exigent circumstances that were not
present in Coolidge. There was no indication, Mr. Justice Stewart noted
in his first explication, that the suspect meant to flee. He had already
had ample opportunity to destroy evidence in the car. Furthermore,
there was no suggestion that particular night that the car was being
used for any illegal purpose-an observation that was in no way explained. There was no "fleeting opportunity" to search the car. Furthermore, he noted, the objects that the police presumably had probable
cause to search for were not stolen nor contraband nor dangerous. He
did not explain this curious observation either, raising, but not giving
substance to, the "mere evidence" specter.
In his second list, Mr. Justice Stewart enumerated other factors
14
showing that it would have been practicable to obtain a warrant.
There was no alerted criminal bent on flight; there was no fleeting
opportunity on an open highway after the chase; there was no reason
to believe the car contained contraband or stolen goods or weapons
(again raising the mere evidence specter); Coolidge had no confederates;
and there was not even the inconvenience of a special police detail.
Coolidge did make clear one proposition: the mere inherent
mobility of an automobile carries no constitutional significance. 1 5 The
Court thus rejected Justice White's contention that a warrant was not
necessary in automobile cases if the search was reasonable. The car
must have some actual potential for, more or less, immediate mobility;
there must be some danger that it will shortly be moved if police take
the time to obtain a warrant.
However, the search in Chambers was clearly beyond the scope of
a valid search incident to an arrest. Furthermore, the vehicle was
safely in custody at the time the search was carried out. What then did
Coolidge do to Chambers? Mr. Justice Stewart, in trying to reconcile
the two, raised a further anomaly. Chambers, he explained, did not
extend the Carroll exception. It simply stood for the proposition that,
given a valid initial seizure, the actual search could be delayed until
after the car was in police custody. Under this rule the question becomes: was the initial intrusion justified? The Court found a significant difference
11a Id. at 460.
114 Id. at 462.
115 Id. at 461 n.18.
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between stopping, seizing, and searching a car on the open highway,
and entering private property to seize and search an unoccupied,
parked vehicle not then being used for any illegal purpose. 116
Although he would have held Chambers inapplicable because
Coolidge's car had been held so long before it was searched, Mr. Justice
White, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed sharply with the majority's
limitations on Carroll and Chambers.1 17 He once more set forth his
view that some kinds of searches must be carried out under exigent
circumstances so often that they can, as a matter of course, be conducted without a warrant. He also accused the majority of resurrecting the mere evidence rule, and of forbidding the warrantless search
of any vehicle that is not moving when seized. Mr. Justice White's
dissent made clear the difference between his approach and the StewartHarlan approach that a search without a warrant is presumptively
invalid. To Mr. Justice White, because the class of searches involving
automobiles so often presents situations in which a warrant cannot
be obtained, all car searches, for consistency's sake, should be treated
in the same manner-no warrant required. But, as an alternative, he
suggested that the Court escape from its present bind by either unequivocally adopting his view or by treating vehicle searches and
18
building searches alike.
It is difficult to say just what is the most troublesome question
raised by Coolidge. The references to the fact that the Coolidge car
was not, at the time of its seizure, being used for any illegal purpose
may not, as alleged, resurrect the mere evidence rule at all. Rather,
it may represent a willingness to limit the Carroll doctrine to those
situations in which the car is presently being used for an illegal purpose. While this narrow interpretation is not required by Carroll,
neither is it inconsistent with the Carroll doctrine. In fact, Cooper
would then make sense. But, if the Court intended to limit Carroll in
this way, it did not say so, and it did not face up to the problems that
this limitation would present.
Another question raised and left open by Coolidge concerns cars
which are not moving or even occupied at the time they are seized,
but which are not under the same degree of police control as the car
in Coolidge. Lower courts tend to consider such cars as "mobile." 119
There is no need to elaborate on the wedding of Chambers, with
116 Id. at 463 n.20.
117 Id. at 523-27.
118 Id. at 527.

119 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Cady, No. 71-1094 (7th Cir., June 2, 1972); United States
v. Leazar, 460 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.
1972). But see People v. Railey, 496 P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1972).
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its relaxed view of the warrant requirement, to Coolidge's strict interpretation, except to note the anomaly to which this union has given
birth. Now, a car that is mobile, when seized, may, for several hours
thereafter, be searched without a warrant even though it is less accessible to any potential allies of the criminal than was the house in
Chimel.
It is true, as Mr. Justice Stewart asserted in Coolidge, that the
Court cannot achieve perfect harmony or logical consistency in applying the fourth amendment to the infinite variety of search and seizure
situations which confront law enforcement officers. But, as Mr. Justice
White says, the Court must do better than it has if the courts, let
alone law enforcement officers, are to make any sense at all of the
warrant requirement with respect to car searches.
The Court could go a long way toward developing a coherent constitutional car search standard if it could achieve agreement on answers
to two questions. It must decide just what makes an automobile
"mobile," and thus the proper object of a warrantless search. Since
its inherent mobility is "of no constitutional significance," just how
does an automobile acquire "mobility" in the constitutional sense, and
how does it lose it? Coolidge and Chambers, read together, do not
provide a satisfactory answer.
But, the more fundamental question has to do with the nature of
the warrant requirement. Is it that a search must be accompanied by a
warrant unless, at the precise moment the search takes place, it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant? If so, then the Chambers stationhouse search must be carried out pursuant to a warrant unless it is
impossible to obtain one in the foreseeable future. Chambers itself
would have to be overruled. Or, is the warrant requirement to be interpreted as amenable to a blanket exception for automobile searches?
Should the strict warrant-requirement test yield to the "reasonableness"
view of Mr. Justice White that, because probable cause to search an
automobile so often arises in circumstances where a warrant cannot be
obtained, the rule should be that a warrant is not necessary. If this
approach were adopted, then the Coolidge holding, with respect to
the seizure of the "immobile" car, would lose much of its force for the
inherent mobility of an automobile would create a presumption that
the warrantless search is reasonable.
One thing is clear with respect to automobile searches and the
warrant requirement. The Supreme Court is at a crossroads. Whichever
path it is to take-the one suggested by Chambers or the road favored
by Coolidge-must be more clearly marked than are the present confusing trails left by these cases and their predecessors.

1972]

AUTOMOBILE SEARCH

INVENTORY-NcESSARY

PROTECTION OR CONSTITUTIONAL INVASION?

The inventory is the second warrantless automobile search exception. Frequently, cars are impounded by the police t20 when towed
away for illegal parking, after an accident, or subsequent to the arrest
of the occupant. 12' Upon impounding, the car is inventoried, 122 during
which the parts as well as the contents are checked and listed. 1 3
In light of the fourth amendment's general prohibition against
warrantless searches, inventories immediately raise constitutional questions. Thus, the validity of the inventory rests on whether or not it
constitutes a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Unfortunately, the courts which first dealt with inventories did not carefully
and logically examine the constitutional implications. This was partially
due to inventories arising in situations in which they could be merged
or confused with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, 124 such
as searches incident to arrest, warrantless probable cause searches, or
plain view seizures.
The United States Supreme Court in Preston, Cooper, and Harris
was confronted with specific police activity in automobile searches
which could have been treated as inventories. In Preston and Cooper,
the Court did not discuss the inventory issue but rather based its
120 The impounding of the automobile is justified by specific statutory authorization,
e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 22850 (West 1971); police regulation, e.g., Comment, The Inventory Search of an Impounded Vehicle, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 48 (1971); or on general
police practice, e.g., State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S.
912 (1970).
121 Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the Exclusionary
Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE L. RaV. 197, 197 (1972).

122 The inventory may take place on the scene prior to towing. E.g., United States
ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 989 (D.N.J. 1972). However, it occurs more frequently
after the car has been removed. E.g., St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (967);
Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1971); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184
S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 1073 (1972).
123 E.g., Towed Vehicle Report, Police Department, Newark, N.J. Section 20 of the
report provides for an inspection of the condition of the vehicle. Checks to be made to
determine the extent of any damage include the testing of locks on the doors and trunk.
Section 21 lists the items to be included in the inventory--wheels, tires, hubcaps, spare
tire, bumpers, wipers, motor, battery, radiator, transmission, air conditioning, inside
and outside mirrors, keys, ignition, seats, radio, stereo tape deck, and any other parts
obviously missing, stripped or damaged. Furthermore,
[m]ost agencies require the officer to remove all valuable property found in the
automobile and secure this property inside the pound office or with a specified
custodian of personal property.
Comment, supra note 120, at 48.
124 See United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Hock; 54 N.J.
526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970); State v. Olsen, 43 Wash. 2d 726,
263 P.2d 824 (1953).
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opinions on a search incident to an arrest in the former, and a for125
feiture provision of a California statute in the latter.
Notwithstanding the Court's apparent effort to avoid a decision
on the inventory issue, 126 the opinion in Harris v. United States 27 has
been used to justify it.128 The accused was arrested and his car impounded because it had been observed leaving the scene of a robbery.
The auto was inventoried pursuant to a police regulation requiring
that a thorough search be made of any impounded car. A discovered
registration card implicating the accused was held to be admissible.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Harris implies that the card was
found during the inventory; however, the circuit court's opinion,
referred to by the Supreme Court, clearly demonstrates that the in12 9
ventory was completed before the card was discovered by the police.
The officer, acting "for the sole purpose of rolling up the windows,"' 3 0
found the card in plain view. The Court stated that "the discovery of
the card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure taken
to protect the car while it was in police custody."''1s
Therefore, Harriswas based on the traditionally accepted doctrine
of plain view. Hence, in the absence of any controlling Supreme Court
decision, the inventory must be examined in light of traditional constitutional precepts.
See pp. 119-24 supra.
The Court noted:
The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation [inventory] is not presented by this case.
390 U.S. at 236. Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion:
[I]n the present case (1) the car was lawfully in police custody, and the police
were responsible for protecting the car; (2) while engaged in the performance
of their duty to protect the car, and not engaged in an inventory or other search
of the car, they came across incriminating evidence.
Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
127 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
128 E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Criscola,
21 Utah 2d 272, 275 n.6, 444 P.2d 517, 519-20 (1968).
129 The circuit court, adopting the facts of the district court, found that there were
two purposes for the check of the car.
One was to inventory its contents as required by the regulation, and the other
was to roll up the windows because it was raining. Accomplishment of the former
purpose was begun by opening the door on the driver's side of the car; and a
complete examination of the interior of the car was made through, and by means
of, this mode of entry. Having completed this examination, the officer then went
around to the other side of the car for the sole purpose of rolling up the windows.
When he opened the right front door for this purpose, there came into his view
a registration card which had been lying on the door jamb concealed by the
closed door.
Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
130 Id.
131 390 U.S. at 236.
125
126
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Bona Fide Inventory v. Exploratory Search
Several different approaches and solutions have been developed by
the courts of various jurisdictions when faced with the complex constitutional arguments concerning inventories. Courts 3 2 and commentators, 33 who uphold the validity of the inventory, argue its necessity
in order to protect the car owner, 34 police officers, and those who tow
and store the auto from claims of stolen or lost property. 3 5 Opponents
of the inventory counter that these justifications are not sufficient to
permit the widespread invasion of personal privacy which the warrantless inventory produces. 36
The majority of courts, which have considered the problem, have
upheld the validity of the inventory, 137 but have placed limitations
See note 137 infra.
E.g., Murray & Aitken, supra note 3.
134 In Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 84 S.E.2d 781, cert. denied, 408 U.S.
1073 (1972), the court stated:
It has always been the public policy of the Commonwealth to preserve and
protect the individual rights of its citizens. Public policy also dictates that a
citizen's rights in his property shall likewise be preserved and protected. Thus it
would appear, and we so hold, that the policy established and the procedure followed by the Roanoke Police Department to protect the property of a citizen
arrested away from his home in possession of property where no other immediate
means is available for safekeeping of such property are reasonable and in accord
with the public policy of the Commonwealth set forth earlier.
Id. at -, 184 S.E.2d at 782.
135 In State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970),
the court said the purpose of the examination was "to inventory its contents to protect
the police against excessive claims and to safeguard the suspect's rightful interest therein."
Id. at 534-35, 257 A.2d at 703. In Hefley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967), the court
said
[s]uch practice [inventory) is deemed necessary to defeat dishonest claims of theft
of the car's contents and to protect the temporary storage bailee against false
charges.
Id. at 103, 423 P.2d at 668. Murray & Aitken, supra note 3, at 128, stated: "If it is not
abused, the right to inventory the contents of an impounded car is a reasonable precaution against theft claims."
Prior to 1964 or 1965 it was not customary to remove, inventory and separately store the contents of vehicles which came into possession of the police
for safekeeping unless the police were specially requested to do so. In 1964 or
1965, however, complaints were made and claims for reimbursement filed by the
owners of vehicles who claimed property was lost or stolen while their cars were
so stored. The procedure for removal, inventory and separate storage of the contents of vehicles in safekeeping was instituted then in an effort to prevent theft
or loss of property from stored vehicles.
Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, -, 184 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 1073 (1972).
136 Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 705-06, 484 P.2d 84, 88, 94 Cal. Rptr.
412, 416 (1971). Baker & Khourie, supra note 35, at 63 refer to inventories as "[p]erhaps
the most insidious of the devices which could be employed by some law enforcement
agencies to subvert fourth amendment rights."
137 E.g., United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967); St. Clair v. State, I
132
133
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upon it. First, the inventory must be bona fide and not exploratory in
nature. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in St. Clair v. State,138 ruled
that a decision to inventory a car was justified because it was done for
the purpose of safeguarding property and "not for the purpose of
making an exploration for incriminating evidence.' 139 The court
recognized that a search conducted truly for the purpose of inventory
was distinct from, and could not be used as a subterfuge for a search
for evidence.
The distinction between an inventory and an exploration creates
confusing and difficult questions of fact. In Heffley v. State,140 a state
court permitted the search as a bona fide inventory. 141 Examining the
same case on habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit accepted the inventory concept, but said "the undisputed
evidence here demonstrates that the purpose of the search of Heffley's
142
automobile was exploratory."'
Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967); People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323
N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971); State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); Cabbler v.
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 1073 (1972). In
State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970), the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in dictum, supported inventory searches. That case, however, combines many different factors including a search for proof of ownership, an inventory
search and a plain view seizure. The court, however, does say that even if the gun had
not been partially visible and had been discovered during a thorough search, it would
have been admissible. The court relied upon the general concept of reasonableness, and
referred to the inventory purposes in protecting police as well as suspects. Id. at 535, 257
A.2d at 703.
1s8 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967).
139 Id. at 618, 232 A.2d at 573.
140 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967), habeas corpus granted sub nom., Heffley v.
Hocker, 420 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded, 399 U.S. 521 (1970). The Supreme Court's vacation and remand was based on Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970).
141 Upon the following facts the state and federal courts came to opposite conclusions.
Heffiley was stopped while in an automobile by an officer responding to a radio report that
a person answering Heffiley's description was attempting to sell guns to pawnshops. When
the officer observed guns in the car he arrested him and had him taken to the police
station. The car was also taken to the police station where it was thoroughly searched.
Other cases in which two courts came to different conclusions on the same set of facts
similarly demonstrate the difficulties inherent in this narrow distinction between bona
fide inventories and exploratory searches. In Pigford v. United States, 273 A.2d 837 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1971), the defendant had been arrested on three outstanding traffic warrants. He
drove his own automobile to the station and parked it outside. Unable to post bail he
was detained. An hour later the police took the keys to the car, entered it and searched the
glove compartment, under the seats and in the trunk. Stolen property was discovered in
the trunk. The court upheld the constitutionality of inventories but held this inventory
invalid as an exploratory search.
142 Heffiley v. Hocker, 420 F.2d 881, 885-86 n.8 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded,
399 U.S. 521 (1970).
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A second limitation on the extent of the inventory has been suggested by some courts. 143 For instance, presuming the purpose of the
inventory is to protect the valuables of the car owner, it is hard to
justify searching under and around the car radiator, under the frame,
144
and so on. Nevertheless, some courts have justified extensive searches.
The better view appears to have been expressed in People v. Andrews 145
where the California Court of Appeals limited the scope of the inventory:
The inventory must be reasonably related to its purpose which is
the protection of the car owner from loss, and the police or other
custodian from liability or unjust claim. It extends to the open
areas of the vehicle, including such areas under seats, and other
places where property is ordinarily kept, e.g., glove compartments
and trunks. It does not permit a search of hidden places, certainly
not the removal of car parts in an effort to locate contraband or
other property. The owner having no legitimate claim for protection of property so hidden, the police could have no legitimate
interest in seeking it out.1 46
Courts which have upheld the inventory, either with or without
limitations on the purpose or scope, generally have not examined the
constitutional basis for the relaxation of the warrant requirement. Instead, they merely referred to the reasonableness of the inventory
procedure in light of its purposes and deemed it to be constitutional.
A Closer Scrutiny
Recently a number of courts have directly dealt with the constitutional implications of warrantless inventories and two diverse theories
have been developed to justify them. The first approach recognized that
a search requires a warrant, but that an inventory is not a search. In
People v. Sullivan147 the New York court relied on the Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure to define an automobile search as "an
intrusion under color of authority on an individual's 'vehicle', 'for the
143 See People v. Andrews, 6 Cal. App. 3d 428, 85 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970); People v. Garrison, 189 Cal. App. 2d 549, 11 Cal. Rptr. 398
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
144 Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1970) (admitting evidence found in litter
bag above sun visor and in air breather at top of carburetor). State v. Olsen, 43 Wash.
2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953) (This case, justified on both incident-to-arrest and inventory
theories, allowed a search of the "space between the car radiator and the front gril" and
"on a ledge under the dashboard.").
145 6 Cal. App. 3d 428, 85 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
146
147

Id. at 437, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (emphasis in original).
29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
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purpose of' seizing things."' 148 The court reasoned that, since the
primary purpose of the inventory is not "seizing things," an inventory
is not a search.
However, in Mozzetti v. Superior Court,1 49 the California court
rejected this approach as overly technical and semantic. Quoting from
Terry v. Ohio' 50 that "the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions
by agents of the public upon personal security,"' 51 the court continued:
It seems undeniable that a routine police inventory of the
contents of an automobile involves a substantial invasion into
the privacy of the vehicle owner. Regardless of professed benevolent purposes and euphemistic explication, an inventory search involves a thorough exploration by the police into the private
15 2
property of an individual.
The court was unwilling to draw a distinction between an intrusion
for inventory purposes and an intentional search for evidence.
Merely because the police are not searching with the express purpose of finding evidence of crime, they are not exempt from the
requirements of reasonableness set down in the Fourth Amendment. Constitutional rights may not be evaded through the route of
finely honed but nonsubstantive distinctions. 15
The majority of cases upholding the inventory have not relied
upon the Sullivan rationale, but instead have recognized that the inventory is a search governed by the fourth amendment which may be
reasonable under the circumstances. The reasonableness doctrine presupposes the division of the fourth amendment into two parts-one
requires a warrant:
[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or thing to be seized. 54
The other requires only that the search be reasonable:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
148

Id. at 77, 272 N.E.2d at 469, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (quoting from ABA-ALI

CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROcEDuRE, art. 1, § SS 1.01 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 3,

MODEL

1970)).
Even accepting the interpretation of Sullivan, it is still necessary to decide the intent
of the police officer as to whether or not his purpose is to seize things when he makes the
inventory.
149 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
150 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
151 4 Cal. 3d at 705, 484 P.2d at 87, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (quoting from 392 U.S. at
18 n.15).
152 Id. at 705-06, 484 P.2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
153 Id. at 706, 484 P.2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
154 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
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papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... 155
The exceptions to the warrant requirement are a recognition that,
although a warrant is generally necessary, certain circumstances such
as consent, arrest, mobility, or emergency, create a situation in which
it is unnecessary or impossible to require a warrant. However, while
it is not always necessary to fulfill the warrant requirement, a search
must always meet the reasonableness criterion of the fourth amendment.
In Terry v. Ohio,156 the Supreme Court decided that the reasonableness criterion of the fourth amendment did apply to the investigatory stop and frisk by officers, but that the warrant requirement did
not. 15 7 The Court commented:
We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure . . . or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only
be excused by exigent circumstances ....
But we deal here with
an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat
-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could
not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct
involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 158
Those courts permitting inventories consider them a necessary part
of the police practice and procedure in protecting the vehicle owner
and police. However, the courts have recognized that although inventories must be carried out reasonably, a warrant is not required.159
Mozzetti examined this argument in great detail, but refused to
extend further the warrantless search exceptions to inventories. Stating
155 Id.

156 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
157 Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), which had applied the fourth
amendment warrant requirement to administrative inspections even though in certain
instances the warrant could be dispensed with. The Court was unwilling to limit the
fourth amendment only to the traditional police search for evidence,
158 392 U.S. at 20 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
159 In Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1970), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 1073 (1972), the court stated:
The Fourth Amendment does not preclude the states from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet the practical demands
of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement in the states, provided
that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures . ...
Id. at -, 184 S.E.2d at 783. The court then held that the inventory procedure was constitutional within the demands of criminal investigation and law enforcement.
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that " 'there must be compelling reasons and exceptional circumstances
to justify a search in the absence of a search warrant,' "160 the court
recognized
the vehicle owner's countervailing interest in maintaining the
privacy of his personal effects and preventing anyone, including
the police, from searching suitcases, and other closed containers
and areas in his automobile at the time the police lawfully remove it to storage.' 6 1
The court then specifically set forth various reasons that indicated a
lack of exigent circumstances to justify an inventory: the car could
have been adequately protected by locking the doors and rolling up the
windows; 162 if the purpose of the search was beneficial to the owners,
consent could have and should have been obtained; 163 the police who
take the car into custody are only involuntary bailees and, thus, their
liability is minimal; 6 4 and legal custody by the police or by an involuntary bailee does not create a possessory right justifying a search. 16 5
The Mozzetti fact situation involved a car accident in which the
defendant was injured and taken to a hospital. The car was towed to
police storage and, upon inventory, a police officer found and opened
a small, unlocked suitcase in which he discovered marijuana. Perhaps,
if the police had merely noted the presence of the suitcase, but not
opened it, the court would not have been so concerned with the invasion of privacy. Analytically, Mozzetti can be read narrowly and
restricted to situations in which suitcases or the like are opened, or
broadly to reject all inventories. The language of the decision seems
to support the latter.
Recently, the New Jersey federal district court adopted an apparent middle position. 166 Officers, observing defendant's attempts to
start his car, investigated. Subsequent to a routine check of the defendant's license and registration, which proved valid, a call to headquarters revealed that he was wanted on an outstanding narcotics
charge. After arresting him, the officers returned to inventory the car
before having it towed away. In plain view, protruding halfway from
160 4 Cal. 3d at 706, 484 P.2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (quoting from People v.
Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 578, 394 P.2d 67, 69, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533 (1964)).
161 Id. at 707, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
162 Id.
I63 Id. at 708, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
164 Id. at 708-10, 484 P.2d at 89-91, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417-19; see Comment, supra note
121, at 205.
165 4 Cal. 3d at 710-11, 484 P.2d at 91, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
166 United States ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 989 (D.N.J. 1972).
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between the back rest and front seat were glassine envelopes that proved
to contain heroin. The court permitted the inventory but restricted it to
those items in plain view inside the car. In rejecting the contention
that an inventory is per se reasonable, and demanding that each factual
situation be analyzed separately, the court arguably would not have
allowed the search of closed areas, such as the trunk or glove compartment.
Unfortunately, this case, like Harris and many others, did not
make a sharp distinction between a seizure of articles in plain view and
an inventory:
We feel that because the police inventory did not intrude into
areas out of plain view the seizure was proper. In addition, we
note that the purpose of the intrusion was to inventory objects in
the automobile. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact
that petitioner had a battery stolen from his automobile the night
before, we cannot condemn the procedure used here. 16 7
Judge Lacey made a point of restricting his decision to the exact facts
of the case: "We hold that the limited search and seizure was proper
under the highly individualized facts presented here.' 6 8 Although the
precedent value of the case is questionable, it points up the need to
distinguish the validity of inventories on their particular facts.
In another case involving a detailed scrutiny of the facts,
Arizona, faced with the search of a suitcase in an auto similar to the
situation in Mozzetti, aligned itself with the California decision, stating: "Although there are cases to the contrary, we find the opinion in
Mozzetti to be compelling and well reasoned."' 69 While the lower court
had decided that the inventory was made in good faith, the supreme
court, greatly influenced by the invasion of personal effects, rejected as
fallacious the property protection rationale for the inventory:
Unscrupulous persons who desire to steal articles will simply not list
them on the inventory. Owners who wish to assert spurious claims
against law enforcement officers or the garage owners can simply
claim that the officers did not list them on the inventory. In fact, we
can envision instances when the taking of an inventory may actually alert potential thieves to the value of items contained in the
automobile.170
Additionally, consent could have been obtained, but was not.
Id. at 992.
Id. (emphasis added).
169 In re One 1965 Econoline, 17 Ariz. App. 64, -,
170 Id. at -, 495 P.2d at 508-09.
167
168

495 P.2d 504, 506 (1972).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:105

This element of consent is one factor which distinguishes Mozzetti
and similar cases from those in which consent was not obtainable.
In New York, where Sullivan was decided, the New York City
Police towed away more than 2,000 illegally parked cars a week to
storage lots where the cars were inventoried. The court, in upholding
the inventory, said the purpose of the search was to protect the contents,
the police and the bailee. "It is manifest that in inspecting vehicles
they take into their custody, in the absence of drivers, the police are
not seeking evidence of crime .... 11
Sullivan, therefore, appears to be the type of case in which an
inventory is appropriate: the car was impounded for a parking violation, there was no suspicion that the car contained evidence, and there
was no realistic and economic means available of obtaining consent.
An interesting approach to the problem of inventories has been
presented in Mayfield v. United States.17 2 The court did not directly
reject the inventory as unconstitutional,' 7 3 but did conclude that any
incriminating evidence discovered would be inadmissible. Nevertheless,
174
Judge Ely in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Mitchell
adopted the Mayfield view, permitting
extensive inventory searches of seized vehicles, so as fully to protect
the police, but to forbid, over the objection of one having standing, the use of any item seized in the search as evidence against the
objector .... 175

This solution accomplishes the purposes of the inventory, namely that
the police may list all objects found in the car, but they may not seize
anything incriminating. Although an interesting and pragmatic approach, the conflict with traditional constitutional concepts is evident.
First, the plain view rule permits the admission of evidence discovered
by law enforcement agents otherwise acting legally. Secondly, it offends
the principle that "[t]he purpose of the fourth amendment is to secure
to everyone the right to privacy, not to protect the accused from conviction.1 176 With these overlapping principles in mind, it has been
171 29 N.Y.2d at 71, 272 N.E.2d at 465, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 947. It should be noted that
there was a strong dissent emphasizing that "the inventory conducted by the police was
a general, indeed unlimited, search of a car which should not be tolerated." Id. at 80, 272
N.E.2d at 471, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting).
172 276 A.2d 123 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
173 This would apparently eliminate any possibility of a civil action being brought
against the police officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
174 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972).
175 Id. at 966.
176 Comment, supra note 120, at 57.
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suggested that the Mayfield approach does not comport with our constitutional framework. 177 Judge Ely dealt with this when he stated:
The adoption of such a rule, which has already gained some support, would, I believe, work an effective compromise between
significantly conflicting interests and most nearly effectuate the
delicate and even balance for which we are supposed to strive.
Moreover, such a rule would appear to comport with the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that "evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion
approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents."' 178
The doctrine postulated in Mayfield, with which Judge Ely concurs in his dissent in Mitchell, focuses on the current debate over the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule whose effectiveness in achieving its
intended results has recently been attacked. 179 The Mayfield doctrine,

which squarely relies on the exclusionary rule without any pretence
of protecting everyone from unconstitutional searches and seizures.
would appear to be in doubt in light of these attacks.
Suggested Approach
Four different approaches' 0 suggest solutions to the inventory
problem: (1) declare the warrant requirements inapplicable to inventories and only hold the police to the reasonableness standard of
the fourth amendment; (2) declare the inventory to be constitutional
but exclude all incriminating evidence seized; (3) declare all inventories
to be invalid; or (4) decide each case on its specific factual pattern and
permit warrantless inventories when intelligent, knowing and uncoerced consent' 8 ' is obtained; if consent cannot be economically and
177 Id.

178 458 F.2d at 966 (footnote omitted) (quoting from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13
(1968)).

179 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, in the Appendix, noted several articles
disapproving the exclusionary rule. Id. at 426-27. See also State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279
A.2d 675 (1971); Gibbons, Practical Prophylaxis and Appellate Methodology: The Exclusionary Rule as a Case Study in the Decisional Process, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 295 (1972);

Kessler, The Crime Crisis and Proposed Procedural Reform, 5 LoYoLA U.L.A.L. Rav. 1
(1972).
180 But see Comment, supra note 120, at 157-58, wherein the author fails to include
the fourth alternative listed herein.
181 A person should have his choice of consenting to an inventory of his car or of
signing a waiver which would immunize the police officers and the storage bailee from
any loss.
Although this has significant appeal, it also raises certain problems including:
1) The rights or duties of the police when they are unable to find the person with
the power to consent.
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realistically obtained the inventory should only be sustained if it is:
(a) a bona fide inventory as opposed to an exploratory search with the
burden on the state to prove that it was bona fide; (b) confined to those
areas of the automobile where it would be likely to find valuables; and
(c) limited to a listing of any closed suitcases, packages, containers or the
like, without any inspection of their contents, except under extraordinary circumstances. The fourth alternative, although more difficult in
its application, appears to be more just in balancing the constitutional
rights involved.
CONCLUSION

The evolution of the car search doctrine from Carroll to Coolidge
is replete with significant vagaries. The validity of the inventory and
its permissible scope lack definition. The failure of the Supreme Court
to clearly and consistently answer the questions posed by the warrantless search of the automobile has not only created a gap in constitutional theory, but created grave practical problems for law enforcement
officials in applying the constitutional standards.
The possible invasion of privacy engendered by these vague constitutional dimensions mandates that the Supreme Court decisively
indicate the metes and bounds of automobile searches.
2) The general problems that arise, in every consent search: intelligent waiver of
rights without coercion; and whether a person confronted by the police can ever give
a truly uncoerced consent.
3) The effect of the failure to consent in terms of further investigation and exploration by the police.
These problems cannot be totally resolved, but it would appear that if the officers
make a good faith effort to find the owner, they should not be prohibited from making
an inventory. Secondly, methods could be developed which would assume a truly uncoerced consent. This could be achieved by requiring that the police inform the person
that he has a right not to consent and that his failure to consent could not be used
against him in any way. Finally, the refusal to consent could not be used in any way
against the person, either as an aspect of probable cause or for any purpose in the trial.

